



# **EUROPEAN ELECTORAL REFORM**

**2029**

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**Restructuring the European Electoral System**



## Abstract

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This paper examines an alternative electoral system for the European Parliament while it also introduces a second legislative chamber and a reformed way to elect the executive. The proposed system is a  $\frac{2}{3}$  Proportional Representation System with  $\frac{1}{3}$  First-Past-The-Post per nation. The aim of the paper is to compare and discuss the implications of such a system compared to the current system. To do so, simulations of the results of the three past European Parliament elections are conducted (2014-2024) using the existing European Parliament groupings. The results of the simulations showed that the number of possible coalitions increases dramatically, but most importantly so do the seats of existing coalition options. Therefore, the proposed system allows for more potential coalitions alongside with more flexibility and stability, while also improving ideological representation in the parliament. In addition, the paper expands on the legislative branch by elucidating an alternative way to elect the European executive branch, in this case the Chancellorship. The proposed system is a two-round chancellor election with a first round being based on point akin to the US electoral college and the second round being a runoff election between the best two performers; the paper takes into account the concept of tactical voting and voter alienation to conclude that the EPP would emerge as the winner.



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## Introduction

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### Methodology

This paper aims to evaluate alternative electoral systems to the current one using Proportional Representation (PR) per European state (European Parliament 2024), elucidate their advantages, and compare them to the present system. The proposed system to replace the current PR one is a combination of PR and first-past-the-post (FPTP), where each state will elect  $\frac{2}{3}$  of its parliamentarians using PR and the other  $\frac{1}{3}$  using a nationwide FPTP system; moreover, an upper chamber, the European Senate is added, the representatives of which are elected through a FPTP system of 2 seats per nation regardless of population; lastly, the European Commission President, now the Chancellor, is elected directly by the people using an innovative points based system.

The methodology to achieve those means consists of numerous simulations of the past European Elections of 2024 & 2019. The results of the 2024 election cycle are also used to simulate the proposed electoral system under ideological lines, instead of the current European grouping lines, so as to get a more accurate and timeless representation of the results under both PR and FPTP.

Furthermore, comparative political analysis is performed to elicit the benefits of our proposed system, focusing on the concepts of stability, national consensus, and expanding pluralism through the introduction of the European Senate. This new institution will enable more pluralism in the legislative apparatus, as smaller countries are empowered.

## Simulations

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### 1.1 European Parliament

#### 2024 Electoral Analysis

The European Union's electoral system for the European Parliament is based on pure proportional representation (PR). This means that the number of seats awarded to each political party is directly proportional to its share of the vote in elections. In other words, if a party receives a given proportion of the vote, it will win a corresponding amount of seats. While this system looks like it has the most accurate representation, it fails to take into account human nature and the idea of a national consensus.

Country	The Left	Greens	S&D	Renew	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	Non Inscripts
Austria	0	11.08	23.22	10.14	24.52	0	<b>25.36</b>	0	0
Belgium	10.7	6.32	15.49	<b>18.4</b>	8.34	13.97	14.5	0	0
Bulgaria	0	0	7.01	24.29	<b>28.36</b>	6.04	0	13.98	0
Croatia	0	5.93	25.62	0	<b>35.13</b>	8.84	0	0	0
Cyprus	21.49	0	14.79	0	<b>24.78</b>	11.19	0	0	19.36
Czechia	9.56	6.2	0	0	19.83	11.14	<b>26.14</b>	5.73	10.26
Denmark	7.04	17.42	15.57	<b>27.75</b>	15.79	7.39	6.37	0	0
Estonia	0	0	19.3	<b>30.3</b>	21.5	0	14.9	0	0
Finland	17.32	11.27	14.86	17.93	<b>24.77</b>	7.6	0	0	0
France	9.89	5.5	13.83	14.6	7.25	4.38	<b>31.37</b>	1.09	0
Germany	4.17	14.47	13.94	7.85	<b>31.46</b>	0	0	15.89	8.69
Greece	14.92	0	12.79	0	<b>28.31</b>	9.3	3.04	0	17.02
Hungary	0	0	7.03	0	29.6	0	<b>44.72</b>	6.71	0

<b>Ireland</b>	11.1	0	3.4	<b>26.6</b>	20.8	0	0	0	0
<b>Italy</b>	16.8	0	24.1	0	10.12	<b>28.8</b>	9	0	0
<b>Latvia</b>	0	7.53	7.21	9.46	25.37	<b>30.59</b>	6.23	0	0
<b>Lithuania</b>	0	5.95	17.98	13.52	<b>21.33</b>	14.91	0	5.45	0
<b>Luxembourg</b>	0	11.8	21.7	18.3	<b>22.9</b>	11.8	0	0	0
<b>Malta</b>	0	0	<b>45.26</b>	0	42.02	0	0	0	0
<b>Netherlands</b>	4.5	15.7	10.5	<b>19.7</b>	18.6	3.7	17	0	0
<b>Poland</b>	0	6.9	6.3	0	<b>37.1</b>	36.2	0	6.05	6.05
<b>Portugal</b>	8.4	0	<b>32.1</b>	9.1	31.1	0	9.8	0	0
<b>Romania</b>	0	3.05	<b>28.1</b>	8.71	26.92	14.93	0	0	5.03
<b>Slovakia</b>	0	0	0	<b>27.82</b>	7.15	0	0	12.53	31.95
<b>Slovenia</b>	0	10.54	7.77	22.13	<b>38.2</b>	0	0	0	0
<b>Spain</b>	8.13	4.8	30.2	1.63	<b>34.2</b>	0	9.6	0	7.12
<b>Sweden</b>	11.06	13.85	<b>24.77</b>	11.67	23.24	13.17	0	0	0

**Figure 1.11: Percentage of the Vote in Every European Country (2024)**

### **The Proposed System**

In the proposed system, only  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the seats a country is owed will be picked by direct PR. The other  $\frac{1}{3}$  will be picked by FPTP, meaning those seats will all go to the party that gains first place. This not only promotes more stability, but it also considers human nature and the fact that leading parties are sometimes underrepresented in the vote because people do not feel compelled to vote for them because they are in power. Furthermore, the EU must recognize the importance of the concept of 'national consensus' in elections; the importance of finishing first in an election and how it represents a country's political mood; and it cannot be defined solely by a percentage or a number; rather, it must be emphasized.

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Country	PR Seats	FPTP Seats	Country	PR Seats	FPTP Seats	Country	PR Seats	FPTP Seats
Austria	13	7	Germany	64	32	Netherlands	21	10
Belgium	15	7	Greece	14	7	Poland	35	18
Bulgaria	11	6	Hungary	14	7	Portugal	14	7
Croatia	8	4	Ireland	9	5	Romania	22	11
Cyprus	4	2	Italy	51	25	Slovakia	10	5
Czechia	14	7	Latvia	6	3	Slovenia	6	3
Denmark	10	5	Lithuania	7	4	Spain	41	20
Estonia	5	2	Luxembourg	4	2	Sweden	14	7
France	54	27	Malta	4	2			

**Figure 1.12: Number of PR Seats and FPTP Seats per Country**

Country	The Left	Greens	S&D	Renew	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	Non Inscriptis
Austria	0	2	3	1	3	0	3	0	0
Belgium	2	1	3	3	1	2	2	0	0
Bulgaria	0	0	1	3	4	1	0	2	0
Croatia	0	1	3	0	4	1	0	0	0
Cyprus	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1
Czechia	2	1	0	0	3	2	4	1	2
Denmark	1	2	2	3	2	1	1	0	0
Estonia	0	0	1	2	1	0	1	0	0
Finland	2	1	2	2	3	1	0	0	0
France	6	3	8	9	4	3	19	1	0
Germany	3	10	9	5	21	0	0	11	6
Greece	2	0	2	0	5	2	0	0	3
Hungary	0	0	1	0	5	0	7	1	0
Ireland	2	0	0	4	3	0	0	0	0
Italy	10	0	14	0	6	17	5	0	0

<b>Latvia</b>	0	1	1	1	2	2	0	0	0
<b>Lithuania</b>	0	1	2	1	2	1	0	0	0
<b>Luxembourg</b>	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
<b>Malta</b>	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0
<b>Netherlands</b>	1	4	2	5	4	1	4	0	0
<b>Poland</b>	0	2	2	0	13	13	0	2	2
<b>Portugal</b>	1	0	5	1	5	0	2	0	0
<b>Romania</b>	0	1	7	2	7	4	0	0	1
<b>Slovakia</b>	0	0	0	4	1	0	0	2	4
<b>Slovenia</b>	0	1	1	2	3	0	0	0	0
<b>Spain</b>	3	2	13	1	15	0	4	0	3
<b>Sweden</b>	2	2	4	2	3	2	0	0	0


**Figure 1.13: Number of PR Seats Gained with the Proposed System**

<b>Parties</b>	<b>The Left</b>	<b>Greens</b>	<b>S&amp;D</b>	<b>Renew</b>	<b>EPP</b>	<b>ECR</b>	<b>PfE</b>	<b>ESN</b>	<b>Non Inscripts</b>
<b>PR Seats</b>	37	34	89	51	123	52	54	19	22
<b>FPTP Seats</b>	0	0	27	34	103	28	48	0	0
<b>Total Seats</b>	37	34	116	85	226	80	102	19	22

**Figure 1.14: Final Seat Results**

As seen by the table above, this system benefits larger parties or parties which are supported on a larger national scale, and represent not just the views of a percentage of the population but are supported by a national consensus. In other words, parties which manage to win in a specific member state have secured a mandate from their people, and as such are rewarded some extra seats by the  $\frac{1}{3}$  FPTP system.






**Figure 1.15: Diagram showing new Parliament and Change of Seats**

## 2019 Electoral Analysis

Using 2024 to simulate the changes of the proposed system however is not ideal due to the unusual nature of the 2024 election. In 2024, the European Parliament shifted towards the right more than ever by a significant amount.

As demonstrated by **Figure 1.21** there has been a surge in the tilt of the parliament towards the right-wing, more than the usual, where close to  $\frac{1}{3}$  of the parliament is controlled by right-wing to far-right parties.



**Figure 1.21: Ideological Tilt of the European Parliament (1999-2024)**

Therefore, for an accurate simulation the year of 2019 would be more accurate to show the effects that this proposed system would have on the European Parliament.


Country	The Left	Greens	S&D	Renew	EPP	ECR	ID	Non Inscripts
Austria	0	2	3	1	4	0	2	0
Belgium	1	2	2	3	1	2	2	0
Bulgaria	0	0	3	2	5	1	0	0
Croatia	0	0	2	1	3	1	0	2
Cyprus	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
Czechia	1	2	0	4	3	2	2	0
Denmark	1	1	2	3	1	0	1	0
Estonia	0	0	1	2	1	0	1	0
Finland	1	2	1	2	2	0	1	0
France	4	9	4	15	6	0	15	0

Germany	5	17	11	5	19	0	7	0
Greece	4	0	1	0	6	1	0	2
Hungary	0	0	3	2	8	0	0	1
Ireland	2	1	0	2	3	0	0	0
Italy	10	0	13	0	5	4	19	0
Latvia	0	0	1	1	2	1	0	0
Lithuania	0	1	2	2	3	1	0	0
Luxembourg	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Malta	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0
Netherlands	1	2	4	5	4	3	0	0
Poland	0	0	6	0	11	17	0	0
Portugal	3	1	6	0	5	0	0	0
Romania	0	0	7	6	9	0	0	0
Slovakia	0	0	2	1	3	1	0	2
Slovenia	0	0	1	1	3	0	0	0
Spain	4	2	14	6	8	3	0	2
Sweden	1	2	3	2	4	2	0	0

**Figure 1.22: PR Seats in the 2019 Election**

Party	The Left	Greens	S&D	Renew	EPP	ECR	ID	Non Inscript
PR Seats	39	46	97	65	123	40	51	8
FPTP Seats	0	0	29	33	106	17	51	0
Total Seats	39	46	126	98	229	57	102	8

**Figure 1.23: Final Seat Results 2019**



Party	PR System	1/3+2/3 System	Seat change
● The Left	42	39	↓ 3
● Greens	74	46	↓ 28
● S&D	147	126	↓ 21
● Renew	108	98	↓ 10
● EPP	187	229	↑ 42
● ECR	62	57	↓ 5
● ID	76	102	↑ 26
● Non-Inscripts	33	8	↓ 25

## Coalition Scenarios and Advantages

Using the effective number of parties calculation to understand the extent of multiparty division in the parliament, we can draw an effective comparison and the decrease of multipartism due to the proposed changes.

2019		2024	
<i>Before</i>	<i>After</i>	<i>Before</i>	<i>After</i>
5.77	5.22	6.47	3.95

**Figure 1.31: Effect Number of Parties Index**

Sartori defines extreme multiparty system when  $N > 6$ , therefore, as seen in 2024, through the proposed system, the system goes from an extreme multiparty system to a multiparty system with a dominant party ( $4.5 > N > 3.5$ ), which is deemed a more stable and healthier system by political scientists. This improved system can be seen by the new possible coalitions:


2019		2024	
<i>Before</i>	<i>After</i>	<i>Before</i>	<i>After</i>
<u>Centrist Coalition</u> EPP, Renew, S&D 403 seats	<u>Centrist Coalition</u> EPP, Renew, S&D 427 seats	<u>Centrist Coalition</u> EPP, Renew, S&D 442 seats	<u>Grand Coalition</u> EPP, S&D 355 seats
	<u>Center-Right Coalition</u> Renew, EPP, ECR 384 seats		<u>Center-Right Coalition</u> Renew, EPP, ECR 391 seats
	<u>Right-Wing Coalition</u> EPP, ECR, ID 388 seats		<u>Right-Wing Coalition</u> EPP, ECR, PfE 408 seats

**Figure 1.32: Possible Coalition Scenarios**

Whereas only one coalition scenario is possible under the old PR per country system, our proposed system allows for a variety of different coalition options. At the same time, not only are there more options available on the negotiating table, but they are also made significantly more stable.


First and foremost, in 2019, the only coalition option available for lawmakers to have a functional parliament was a centrist one consisting of EPP, Renew, and S&D. Following the adoption of the proposed system, there are two more coalitions available: a centre-right one consisting of Renew, EPP, and ECR, as well as a right-wing one consisting of EPP, ECR, and ID. The aforementioned centrist coalition is also reinforced, gaining an additional 24 seats.

In 2024, the story is similar; this is the case as initially the only feasible coalition was a centrist one, while after the adoption of the proposed electoral system, the 3 observations true in 2019 are also applicable. Furthermore, there is a further realistic alternative, a grand coalition of the EPP and the S&D. This is similar to the centrist coalition from 2019 (which is omitted from Figure 1.32 due to the presence of RE being unnecessary in 2024), only difference being the fact that RE is not needed to form a governing coalition.



**Figure 1.33: Parliament and Coalition Ideological Tilt (2009-2024)**

Originally, the European Parliament's ideological tilt (Parliament tilt on **Figure 1.33**) and the Coalition tilt aligned with each other. That was the case from the very first European Parliament elections till those in the last decade; this is made evident in the Figure for the 2009 and 2014 elections. Moving into 2019 and especially in 2024, that gap has started widening, and the divergence is clear. The two tilts are no longer correlated to such a high extent, leading to the formation of a coalition that no longer represents the parliament's ideological tilt, and as such a tyranny of the minority.



**Figure 1.34: Ideological Tilt based on Parliament and Possible Coalitions (2019-2024)**



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Our proposed system enables a greater number of viable coalition combinations, offering more realistic and representative options that better reflect the political tilt of the European Parliament and the voting preferences of its citizens. This helps end the current dynamic where small junior partners wield disproportionate power. When only one coalition is realistically possible, a party with under 10% of the vote can dictate terms, weakening senior partners and undermining the strength of the legislative system. A healthier model allows senior coalition partners to choose from multiple credible options, increasing both flexibility and accountability. Crucially, the failure to prioritize broad-based, consensus-driven coalitions erodes democratic legitimacy and further alienates the European public; this is an existential flaw in today's European political order.

## **1.2 European Senate**

Under this proposed system, the European Senate would essentially function as the upper chamber of the European legislative branch, serving as the European Union's higher legislative body. Its purpose would be to amend and adopt legislation already approved by the European Parliament.

The proposed Senate structure assigns each member state two representatives, regardless of population size, upholding the principle of equal state representation. Senators would be elected through a modified first-past-the-post (FPTP) system incorporating a proportional difference threshold. If the leading party's margin over the runner-up exceeds 20% of its own vote share, it secures both seats. If the margin falls below this threshold, the seats are split between the top two parties.

This design balances the recognition of clear electoral mandates with the need for pluralistic representation in closely contested states. The Senate's institutional role would be to serve as a counterbalance to the European Parliament so as it functions both as a guardian of national mandates and a structural defense of member state sovereignty, akin to the European Council.

The distinction is that, in contrast to the European Council, political processes will not be hampered by a single nation's veto power (AFP 2023). As a result, it serves as a moderate type of institution that helps avoid the circumstance in which a nation is oppressed by a tyrannical majority without obstructing important laws. Therefore, although it belongs to the executive branch rather than the legislative, the European Council would no longer be required and would be eliminated under our suggested arrangement.



Having a bicameral legislative branch would be extremely advantageous for Europe; smaller countries would be better represented while also providing more checks and balances while legislation is being adopted.

Using **Figure 1.1** to form the table below:


Party	The Left	Greens	S&D	Renew	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	Non-Insc rints
Austria	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
Belgium	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Bulgaria	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Croatia	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
Cyprus	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
Czechia	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
Denmark	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
Estonia	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
Finland	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
France	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
Germany	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
Greece	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
Hungary	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
Ireland	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
Italy	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
Latvia	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
Lithuania	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
Luxembourg	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
Malta	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Poland	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
Portugal	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
Romania	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
Slovakia	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0

<b>Slovenia</b>	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
<b>Spain</b>	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
<b>Sweden</b>	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0

**Figure 2.1: Seats per Party in Senate**

<b>Party</b>	<b>The Left</b>	<b>Greens</b>	<b>S&amp;D</b>	<b>Renew</b>	<b>EPP</b>	<b>ECR</b>	<b>PfE</b>	<b>ESN</b>	<b>Non Inscriptis</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

**Figure 2.2: Total Seats per Party**



**Figure 2.3: European Senate according 2024 Election**

## 1.3 The Chancellorship

The Chancellery is the highest executive position in our proposed electoral reformation, which seeks to replace the role of the President of the EU commission; the Chancellor is elected directly by the European states and the European populace rather than the European Parliament.

The two-round presidential election process used to elect the chancellor follows a system where the top two candidates with the most points in the first round advance to the second round, when victory is determined by a simple plurality. Simultaneously, a points-based system, similar to the US electoral college system, is used in place of a direct popular vote system for the first round. Each member state is given a certain number of points based on its population in addition to two extra points regardless of size to allow for the enhanced participation of smaller nations. In other words, the number of points each country has equals *the number of European Parliament seats + the number of European Senate Seats*, which can be seen in Figure 3.1. Nevertheless, those points are assigned proportionally to candidates, rather than on a first-past-the-post basis (FPTP).

There are two advantages to this odd yet effective technique. Primarily, it supports the notion of regional pluralism, which is the goal of our senate proposal. Second, because two candidates advance to the second round and points are awarded proportionally, it helps prevent the emergence of a two-party system.

Country	Points	Country	Points	Country	Points
Austria	22	Germany	98	Netherlands	33
Belgium	24	Greece	23	Poland	55
Bulgaria	19	Hungary	23	Portugal	23
Croatia	14	Ireland	16	Romania	35
Cyprus	8	Italy	78	Slovakia	17
Czech Republic	23	Latvia	11	Slovenia	11
Denmark	17	Lithuania	13	Spain	63

<b>Estonia</b>	9	<b>Luxembourg</b>	8	<b>Sweden</b>	23
<b>Finland</b>	17	<b>Malta</b>	8		


**Figure 3.11: Electoral Points per State**

Country	The Left	Greens	S&D	Renew	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	Independents
Austria	0	3	5	2	6	0	6	0	0
Belgium	3	2	4	5	2	4	4	0	0
Bulgaria	0	0	2	6	7	1	0	3	0
Croatia	0	1	5	0	7	2	0	0	0
Cyprus	2	0	1	0	2	1	0	0	2
Czechia	2	2	0	0	5	3	7	1	3
Denmark	1	3	3	5	3	1	1	0	0
Estonia	0	0	2	3	2	0	2	0	0
Finland	3	2	3	3	4	1	0	0	0
France	9	5	13	14	7	4	30	1	0
Germany	4	15	14	8	32	0	0	16	9
Greece	4	0	3	0	8	3	1	0	5
Hungary	0	0	2	0	8	0	12	2	0
Ireland	3	0	1	7	5	0	0	0	0
Italy	15	0	21	0	9	25	8	0	0
Latvia	0	1	1	1	3	4	1	0	0
Lithuania	0	1	3	2	4	2	0	1	0
Luxembourg	0	1	2	2	2	1	0	0	0
Malta	0	0	4	0	4	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	2	6	4	7	7	1	6	0	0
Poland	0	4	4	0	21	20	0	3	3
Portugal	2	0	8	2	8	0	2	0	0
Romania	0	1	11	4	11	6	0	0	2
Slovakia	0	0	0	6	2	0	0	3	7
Slovenia	0	1	1	3	5	0	0	0	0

<b>Spain</b>	5	3	20	1	23	0	6	0	5
<b>Sweden</b>	3	3	6	3	5	3	0	0	0

**Figure 3.12: First Round Points per Party**

Candidates for each of the main European groupings, as well as independent, unaffiliated candidates, are awarded points based on how many votes they received in each member state, as can be seen below. For example, the EPP candidate in Spain received 34.2%, which translates to 23 out of the 63 possible points, as seen in Figure 3.2. A candidate for the chancellorship is declared the victor of the contest if they receive an absolute majority of more than 387 points in the first round.



**Figure 3.13: First Round Electoral Map**

In order to properly and accurately simulate the results of the runoff election we need to allocate the voters of the candidates eliminated from the first-round to the top two candidates which progressed to the second round. In the first simulation, we used the assumption that voters would make their decision solely based on ideology and that tactical voting would not be a significant enough phenomenon to have an impact on the outcomes of the second round. However, we have considered shifts in turnout for each party's voting base according to the degree of extremeness of each base, assuming that voters on the far ends of the political spectrum will abstain at higher rates than those in the center in the event that their candidate does not make it to the second round, due to feelings of non-representation (Jones, Sirianni, and Fu 2022). Independents are split evenly between S&D, EPP, as well as abstentions, due to the intricate nature of non-affiliated candidates; these candidates-parties range from extremists like the Stalinist KKE in Greece (Marantzidis 2023), to candidates with mainstream opinions like the minor German Party of Progress (Partei des Fortschritts 2024). Voting per party base in the second round is elucidated in Figure 3.4.

Parties	S&D	EPP	Abstention
Left	85.0%	0.0%	15.0%
Greens	90.0%	5.0%	5.0%
Renew	30.0%	67.5%	2.5%
ECR	0.0%	75.0%	25.0%
PfE	0.0%	60.0%	40.0%
ESN	0.0%	30.0%	70.0%
Independents	25.0%	25.0%	50.0%

**Figure 3.21: Vote Share Transfer Percentages for Round 2**

Country	The Left	Greens	S&D	Renew	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	Non-Inscrints
Austria	0	343480	719820	314340	760120	0	786160	0	0

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<b>Belgium</b>	866700	511920	1254690	1490400	675540	1131570	1174500	0	0
<b>Bulgaria</b>	0	0	175250	607250	709000	151000	0	349500	0
<b>Croatia</b>	0	47440	204960	0	281040	70720	0	0	0
<b>Cyprus</b>	85960	0	59160	0	99120	44760	0	0	77440
<b>Czechia</b>	267680	173600	0	0	555240	311920	731920	160440	287280
<b>Denmark</b>	239360	592280	529380	943500	536860	251260	216580	0	0
<b>Estonia</b>	0	0	77200	121200	86000	0	59600	0	0
<b>Finland</b>	381040	247940	326920	394460	544940	167200	0	0	0
<b>France</b>	2274700	1265000	3180900	3358000	1667500	1007400	7215100	250700	0
<b>Germany</b>	1751400	6077400	5854800	3297000	13213200	0	0	6673800	3649800
<b>Greece</b>	581880	0	498810	0	1104090	362700	118560	0	663780
<b>Hungary</b>	0	0	323380	0	1361600	0	2057120	308660	0
<b>Ireland</b>	222000	0	68000	532000	416000	0	0	0	0
<b>Italy</b>	4032000	0	5784000	0	2428800	6912000	2160000	0	0
<b>Latvia</b>	0	45180	43260	56760	152220	183540	37380	0	0
<b>Lithuania</b>	0	71400	215760	162240	255960	178920	0	65400	0
<b>Luxemburg</b>	0	35400	65100	54900	68700	35400	0	0	0
<b>Malta</b>	0	0	135780	0	126060	0	0	0	0
<b>Holland</b>	315000	1099000	735000	1379000	1302000	259000	1190000	0	0
<b>Poland</b>	0	828000	756000	0	4452000	4344000	0	726000	726000
<b>Portugal</b>	285600	0	1091400	309400	1057400	0	333200	0	0
<b>Romania</b>	0	274500	2529000	783900	2422800	1343700	0	0	452700
<b>Slovakia</b>	0	0	0	361660	92950	0	0	162890	415350
<b>Slovenia</b>	0	84320	62160	177040	305600	0	0	0	0
<b>Spain</b>	1463400	864000	5436000	293400	6156000	0	1728000	0	1281600
<b>Sweden</b>	442400	554000	990800	466800	929600	526800	0	0	0

**Figure 3.22: Votes per Party per Country**

Country	The Left	Greens	S&D	Renew	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	Non-Insc rints
Votes	12,766,720	12,560,860	30,126,730	14,636,450	40,830,740	16,755,090	17,808,120	8,697,390	7,553,950

**Figure 3.23: Total Votes per Party**

Parties	S&D	EPP	Abstention
Left	1085171	0	4519009
Greens	11304774	628043	628043
Renew	4390935	9879603	365911
ECR	0	12566317	4188772
PfE	0	12465684	5342436
ESN	0	2609217	6088173
Independents	1888487	1888487	3776975
Total Votes	17,584,196	40,037,352	20,390,310

**Figure 3.24: Total Votes S&D, EPP, and Abstentions**

The EPP wins the Chancellery strongly due to the right being forced to support it over its rival, even though abstention was still highly present. This second round simulation was created by estimating where voters from losing parties would go while also adjusting for the lower turnout by alienated voters. Due to the nature of the second round where the EPP won by a large amount, tactical voting is unlikely to happen or even affect the outcome.



## Conclusion

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This paper has proposed a comprehensive reform of the European Union's institutional framework by introducing a three-pronged electoral model: a hybrid Parliament elected through a combination of proportional representation and national first-past-the-post voting; a bicameral legislative structure through the creation of a European Senate; and a reformed, points-based method for electing the executive Chancellor via direct democratic legitimacy.

Simulations using electoral data from 2019 and 2024 reveal that this system not only increases the number and variety of viable coalition options, but also reinforces their stability and ideological coherence, avoiding fragile alliances that misrepresent voter intent. By rewarding parties that secure national mandates, the system restores the importance of political consensus and helps combat the democratic deficit currently facing the EU.

The European Senate ensures equal state representation without paralyzing legislation through vetoes, enhancing both pluralism and institutional efficiency. Meanwhile, the Chancellor's election method prevents both dominance by large states and the entrenchment of a two-party system, promoting pan-European legitimacy while still preserving diversity.

Crucially, this structure empowers voters, strengthens accountability, curbs the outsized influence of small junior coalition partners, and closes the widening gap between electoral outcomes and political governance. In an era of increasing fragmentation and political disillusionment, the proposed system offers a pragmatic, scalable, and deeply democratic foundation for a more resilient, representative, and united Europe.

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